The Military History Thread

The story of Antietam...A.P. Hill came up!

 

Jackson's 2nd Corps got chewed up there. Pretty bad too.

 

McClellan, like Meade after him, had a fresh Corps to throw at Lee, and opted not to.

 

"My dear McClellan: If you don't want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a while.

Yours respectfully,
A. Lincoln"

He might have ended the war had he attacked full bore on day 2 instead of allowing Lee to rest and retreat during that night.

 

It was a bloodbath

 

I think that is actually the root of it. Jacksons quarrel was on the worldy side.

 

Was in Canton today at the air museum.

Talked with several World War II aviators/crewman.

A really moving moment when two vets in wheelchairs got to go up one last time.

I am confident that generation could storm hell itself.

 

And kick Hitler & Tojo's ass again.

 

Why did Jackson insist on fghting Hooker/Mansfield for the cornfield, for no other reason than the enemy was there? Hindsight is always 20/20, but McClellan had the attack bug. A withdrawal to the Nicodemous heights might have brought on a Fredericksburg type battle.

 

The Union came upon his position during the dark in the early morning. I'm not sure he knew the enemy strength. Plus he was protecting the Confederate flank, no?

 

He was, Jackson's situation was actually much worse than you'd think. A rearward passage of lines was about impossible in the days of horse couriers, but I still wouldn't have committed D.H. Hill's division. By that time Jackson had to know he was facing at least 2 Corps.

 

It's been a while since I looked at it in depth, but I recall that a withdrawl from his position would open up the possibility that the Union could hook right and cut off Lee's escape route back over the Potomac. He would have essentially been encircled.

 

True, but that gives McClellan a lot of credit. The wild card is how Longstreet's wing was deployed, and the fact that the Light Division was en route from Harper's Ferry.

 

Odd how you should mention McClellan's, uh, abilities. This just hit me a few minutes ago. The real answer might just lie in the fact that Lee and his commanders were very aware of Mac's lack of enthusiasm to press any type of attack or lack of intestinal fortitude to mount a significant defense other than to protect the withdrawl of his main forces when he ran up against stiff resistance or a real or imagined attack by a ficticious superior force. They very well could have been counting on Mac to be Mac. This time, he had some subordinates with at least a hint of a backbone to the ANV's dismay.

 

Lee wanted a victory on Northern soil because he felt that was the best way to prove the CSA could win and hopefully earn at the least recognition by European powers and hopefully outright assistance. He took some big risks at Sharpsburg to get that.

Remember that Lee lost several thousand men that refused to invade the North. They rejoined when they recrossed the Potomac. Did Lee discount that fact?

Also he was coming off a broken hand suffered at 2nd Manassas. He was also having heart issues at the time. Could it be that his lack of mobility forced him to rely more on others' info and they let him down by underestimating the situation?

 

I'll go take a pic of General Mansfield's grave this weekend, right around the corner from the house. One of those guys who sent a corps in because, well, there's a battle goimg on.

 

I'm going to mention Patton shooting two mules on a bridge in Sicily then whipping the owner with a cane because he didn't move them fast enough just because it should be mentioned in any discussion of military history.

 

From Lee's letters you get the feeling that he honestly thought that Maryland was going to join the confederacy whole heartedly and prepared his battle plan accordingly. The plan was ambitious, he wanted to take Philadelphia if not Baltimore as well and get in behind DC. The whole idea was to terrorize the population to force peace.

This is the only the time that his battle plan deviated from a battle of annihilation, or at least until his plan backfired and he wanted to counter attack at Sharpsburg. Who would have thought that Jackson would have been the voice of reason to talk him out of it.

 

Don't forget that McClellan had a copy of Lee's general orders of the invasion that a Confederate officer left behind at a former camp site. That emboldened Mac more than usual.

 

The best part is that the orders may have been over looked if not for being rapped around cigars.

Mac was an emboldened pessimistic administrator, he did not have the willpower to be a field officer.

At least Hooker attempted to squash Lee and lost his nerve.